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Abstract This paper proposes a new decision theory of how individuals make
random errors when they compute the expected utility of risky lotteries. When dis-
torted by errors, the expected utility of a lottery never exceeds (falls below) the utility
of the highest (lowest) outcome. This assumption implies that errors are likely to
overvalue (undervalue) lotteries with expected utility close to the utility of the lowest
(highest) outcome. Proposed theory explains many stylized empirical facts such as the
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, common consequence effect (Allais paradox),
common ratio effect and violations of betweenness. Theory fits the data from ten well-
known experimental studies at least as well as cumulative prospect theory.
Keywords Decision theory . Stochastic utility . Expected utility theory . Cumulative
prospect theory
JEL Classification C91 . D81
Perhaps we should now spend some time on thinking about the noise, rather
than about even more alternatives to EU?
—Hey and Orme (1994), Econometrica 62, p.1322
This paper proposes a new decision theory to describe individual decision making
under risk, as defined by Knight (1921). A normative theory of choice under risk is
expected utility theory, or EUT. However, persistent violations of EUT, such as the
Allais paradox (Allais 1953), make EUT a descriptively inadequate theory (Camerer
1995). Many theories have been proposed to improve the descriptive fit of EUT (see
Starmer (2000) for a recent review). EUT and nearly all non-expected utility theories
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are deterministic theories i.e. they predict that an individual always makes the same
decision in identical choice situations (unless he or she is exactly indifferent between
lotteries). In contrast, this paper proposes a stochastic decision theory to explain the
violations of EUT through the role of random errors. The new model is motivated
both by a recent revival of interest among economic theorists in stochastic decision
theories (Loomes et al. 2002) and by the compelling empirical evidence of random
variation in individuals’ decisions (Ballinger and Wilcox 1997).
For example, Camerer (1989, p.81) reports that 31.6% of the subjects reverse
their preference, when presented with the same choice decision for the second time.
Starmer and Sugden (1989) find that the observed preferences are reversed in 26.5%
of cases. Wu (1994, p.50) reports that the revealed preferences change in 5–45% of
cases when the same binary choice problem is repeated. Hey and Orme (1994) find
that around 25% of choice decisions are inconsistent, when an individual faces the
same choice problem twice and he or she can declare indifference. Moreover, Hey
(2001) provides experimental evidence that the variability of the subjects’ responses
is generally higher than the difference in the predictive error of various deterministic
decision theories. Thus, a model predicting stochastic choice patterns can be a
promising alternative to the deterministic non-expected utility theories.
Existing non-expected utility theories typically do not consider stochastic choice
patterns (see, however, Machina 1985, and Hey and Carbone 1995). Only when the
theoretical model is estimated are assumptions about error specification introduced.
Effectively, the stochastic component plays only a secondary role being regarded as
unimportant on the theoretical level (Hey 2005). Camerer and Ho (1994) use a
stochastic choice model in which the probability of choosing one lottery over
another is simply a logit function of the difference in their utilities according to the
deterministic underlying theory. Harless and Camerer (1994) assume that there is a
constant probability with which an individual reverses his or her deterministic choice
pattern. This probability is the same in all choice problems and it reflects the
possibility of errors such as pure trembles. Hey and Orme (1994) obtain a stochastic
choice pattern by means of a white noise (normally distributed zero-mean error term)
additive on the utility scale. Such an error term reflects the average of various
genuine errors that might obscure a deterministic choice pattern. Hey (1995) and
Buschena and Zilberman (2000) go one step further and assume that this error term
is heteroskedastic. The standard deviation of errors is higher in certain decision
problems e.g. when the lotteries have many outcomes or when the subjects take
more time to make a decision.
This paper proposes a new and more elaborate structure of an error term. The
stochastic component is introduced as a part of the decision theory, which makes
explicit prediction in the form of a stochastic choice pattern. Thus, econometric
estimation of the proposed theory on the empirical data does not require any
additional assumptions about error specification. Moreover, new theory assumes that
individuals have a preference relation on the set of risky lotteries, which admits
expected utility representation. Thus, the proposed theory is essentially a stochastic
extension of neoclassical expected utility theory, so that its estimation is relatively
simple compared to non-expected utility models.
Individuals are assumed to maximize their expected utility when choosing
between risky lotteries. However, individuals make random errors when computing
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the expected utility of a lottery. The errors are additive on the utility scale, as with
Hey and Orme (1994). The distribution of random errors is essentially symmetric
around zero with a restriction that the stochastic utility of a lottery cannot be lower
(higher) than the utility of the lowest (highest) possible outcome for certain. This
assumption reflects a rather obvious fact that there is a limit to a measurement error
that an individual can commit. In particular, violations of obvious dominance, when
a risky lottery is chosen over its highest possible outcome for sure, or when it is not
chosen over its lowest possible outcome for sure, appear to be implausible. Hence,
computational errors are naturally truncated by the highest and the lowest outcomes
in the gamble.
This restriction implies that lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of
the lowest possible outcome (e.g. unlikely gains or probable losses) are more likely to
be overvalued rather than undervalued by random errors. Similarly, lotteries whose
expected utility is close to the utility of the highest possible outcome (e.g. probable
gains or unlikely losses) are likely to be undervalued by random errors. This offers an
immediate explanation for the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes—a risk seeking
behavior in face of unlikely gains or probable losses and a risk averse behavior in face
of probable gains or unlikely losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). A stochastic
version of expected utility theory can also explain other empirical anomalies such as
the common consequence effect and the Allais paradox (Allais 1953), the common
ratio effect and violations of betweenness (Camerer and Ho 1994).
Apart from demonstrating that many empirical paradoxes can be attributed to a
simple stochastic version of expected utility theory, this paper also reexamines the
data from ten well-known experimental studies. The proposed theory accommodates
the experimental data with remarkable success. It fits the data at least as well as such
prominent non-expected utility models as cumulative prospect theory or rank-
dependent expected utility theory. This suggests that a careful specification of the
stochastic structure of the errors that subjects make in the experiments is a promising
avenue for constructing a descriptive decision theory. Systematic errors that subjects
commit when evaluating the expected utility of risky lotteries can account for many
of the well-known empirical anomalies, which have been traditionally attributed to
non-linear probability weighting, regret or disappointment aversion etc.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Stochastic expected utility
theory or StEUT is described in Section 1. Section 2 demonstrates how StEUT
explains many stylized empirical facts such as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
and the Allais paradox. Section 3 tests the explanatory power of StEUT on the data
from ten well-known experimental studies. Section 4 concludes.
1 Theory
Notation L(x1, p1;...xn, pn) denotes lottery L delivering a monetary outcome xi with
probability pi, i∈{1,...,n}. Let x1 be the lowest possible outcome and let xn be the
highest possible outcome. The expected utility of lottery L according to deterministic
preferences of an individual is mL ¼
Pn
i¼1 piu xið Þ. A subjective non-decreasing
utility function u:R→R is defined over changes in wealth rather than absolute wealth
levels, as proposed by Markowitz (1952) and later advocated by Kahneman and
J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286 261
Tversky (1979). An individual makes random errors when calculating the expected
utility μL of a risky lottery.
1
Random errors are assumed to be additive on the utility scale, similar to Hey and
Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Thus, instead of maximizing
deterministic expected utility μL, an individual behaves as if he or she maximizes
stochastic expected utility
U Lð Þ ¼ mL þ xL: ð1Þ
For simplicity it is assumed that an error term xL is independently distributed across
lotteries. In other words, the error which occurs when an individual calculates the
expected utility of one lottery is not correlated with an error when calculating the
expected utility of another lottery.
The stochastic expected utility (1) of a lottery is assumed to be bounded from
below and above. It cannot be less than the utility of the lowest possible outcome for
certain (see, however, Gneezy et al. 2006). Similarly, it cannot exceed the utility of
the highest possible outcome for certain. Formally, the internality axiom holds i.e.
u x1ð Þ  μL þ xL  u xnð Þ, which imposes the following restriction on the cumulative
distribution function ΨL vð Þ ¼ prob xL  vð Þ of a random error xL:
ΨL vð Þ ¼ 0; 8v < u x1ð Þ  μL and ΨL vð Þ ¼ 1; 8v  u xnð Þ  μL: ð2Þ
Assumption (2) implies that there is no error in choice between “sure things.” A
degenerate lottery delivers one outcome for certain, which is simultaneously its
lowest possible and its highest possible outcome (x1=xn). In this case, Eq. (2)
immediately implies that prob(xL=0)=1 i.e. the utility of a degenerate lottery is not
affected by random errors.
For non-degenerate lotteries, the random errors are assumed to be symmetrically
distributed around zero as long as restriction (2) is not violated i.e. prob 0  xL  vð Þ ¼
prob v  xL  0ð Þ for every v 2 0;min μL  u x1ð Þ; u xnð Þ  μLf g½ . Formally, this
corresponds to the restriction
ΨL 0ð Þ þ ΓL vð Þ ¼ ΓL 0ð Þ þ ΨL vð Þ; 8v 2 0;min μL  u x1ð Þ; u xnð Þ  μLf g½ ; ð3Þ
where ΓL vð Þ ¼ prob ξL  vð Þ. Intuitively, random errors are non-systematic if they are
within a reasonable range so that a lottery is not valued less than its worst possible
outcome or more than its best possible outcome. In general, the cumulative distribution
function of random errors for risky lotteries is unknown and it is likely to be lottery-
specific (Hey 1995).
Equations (1)–(3) complete the description of StEUT. Obviously, when prob(xL=0)=
1 for every lottery L, StEUT coincides with the deterministic EUT. StEUT resembles
the Fechner model of stochastic choice e.g. Becker et al. (1963). Both models
introduce an error term, which is additive on the utility scale. However, they differ in
two important aspects.
1 Computational errors occur for a variety of reasons (Hey and Orme 1994). An individual may not be
sufficiently motivated to make a balanced decision. A subject can get tired during a long experiment and
pay less attention (especially if lotteries do not involve losses). A subject can simply press a wrong key by
accident or inertia. Wu (1994, p.50) suggests that subjects can suffer from fatigue and hurry up with their
responses at the end of the experiment.
262 J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286
First, the error term in the Fechner model is a continuous random variable that is
symmetrically distributed around zero and unbounded. In practical applications, it is
typically assumed to be normally distributed (Hey and Orme 1994; Loomes et al.
2002). In contrast, the error term in StEUT is bounded from below and above by a
basic rationality requirement of the internality axiom. For practical estimations, such
an error term can be drawn from a truncated normal distribution (see Section 3).
Second, the error term in the Fechner model affects the difference in the expected
utilities of two lotteries that are compared. We can think of it as a compound error
equal to the difference between two computational errors that occur separately when
an individual evaluates the expected utility of lotteries. Moreover, if computational
errors are normally distributed, their difference is also normally distributed. In
contrast, the error term in StEUT is a genuine computational error that affects the
expected utility of a lottery. When two lotteries are compared, two corresponding
computational errors are taken into account.
2 Stylized facts
2.1 The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is an empirical observation that individuals
exhibit risk aversion when dealing with probable gains or improbable losses, and
exhibit risk seeking when dealing with improbable gains or probable losses (Tversky
and Kahneman 1992). One illustration of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a
simultaneous purchase of insurance and public lottery tickets. Historically, it was the
first descriptive challenge for the deterministic EUT (Friedman and Savage 1948).
A conventional indication of risk averse (seeking) behavior is when the certainty
equivalent of a lottery is smaller (greater) than the expected value of the lottery. In
the context of deterministic decision theories, the certainty equivalent of a lottery is
defined as a monetary outcome which is perceived exactly as good as the lottery
itself. For stochastic decision theories, there is no established definition of a certainty
equivalent in the literature. One can think of at least two intuitive definitions. First,
the certainty equivalent of a lottery can be defined as a monetary outcome which is
perceived to be exactly as good as the average stochastic utility of the lottery.
Second, it can be defined as a monetary outcome which is equally likely to be
chosen or to be rejected, when it is offered as an alternative to a lottery. StEUT is
consistent with the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes when either of these two
definitions is used (as shown below).
Definition 1 The certainty equivalent of lottery L is an outcome CEL that is
implicitly defined by Eq. 4
u CELð Þ ¼ μL þ E xL½ ; ð4Þ
where the expected error E[ξL] can be spelled out as E xL½  ¼
R u xnð ÞμL
u x1ð ÞμLvdΨL vð Þ due to
assumption (2). Assumption (3) implies that E ξL½  ¼
Z μLu x1ð Þ
u x1ð ÞμL
vdΨL vð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼0
þ
Z u xnð ÞμL
μLu x1ð Þ
vdΨL vð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
0
if
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u xnð Þ  μL  μL  u x1ð Þ and E ξL½  ¼
Z μLu xnð Þ
u x1ð ÞμL
vdΨL vð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
0
þ
Z u xnð ÞμL
μLu xnð Þ
vdΨL vð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼0
if μL  u x1ð Þ  u xnð Þ  μL.
Thus, the expected error is positive or zero, i.e. u CELð Þ  μL, when the expected
utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome, i.e.
μL  u x1ð Þ þ u xnð Þð Þ=2. These are improbable gains or probable losses in the
terminology of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The expected error is negative or
zero for lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the highest possible
outcome, i.e. μL  u x1ð Þ þ u xnð Þð Þ=2. These are probable gains or improbable losses
in the terminology of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
Let EVL ¼
Pn
i¼1 pixi denote the expected value of lottery L. Jensen’s inequality
u EVLð Þ  μL holds if and only if an individual has a concave utility function. Thus,
according to StEUT, the individual with a concave utility function exhibits risk
averse behavior only when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of
the highest possible outcome. In this case, u CELð Þ  mL  u EVLð Þ which is
equivalent to CEL≤EVL because utility function u(.) is non-decreasing. When the
expected utility of a lottery is close to the lowest possible outcome, the individual
with a concave utility function is not necessarily risk averse because it is possible
that u CELð Þ  u EVLð Þ  μL i.e. CEL≥EVL.
Now consider an individual with a convex utility function u(.), which implies that
u EVLð Þ  mL. He or she exhibits risk seeking behavior, i.e. CEL≥EVL, only when the
expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome, i.e.
when u CELð Þ  μL  u EVLð Þ. He or she may be risk averse when the expected
utility of a lottery is close to the highest possible outcome, in which case it is possible
that u CELð Þ  u EVLð Þ  mL i.e. CEL≤EVL. Thus, StEUT is consistent with the
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes when the certainty equivalent is defined by Eq. (4).
Definition 2 The certainty equivalent of lottery L is an outcome CEL* that is
implicitly defined by equation
prob u CEL*
   μL þ xL  ¼ prob μL þ xL  u CEL*  ; ð5Þ
or, equivalently, by equation
ΨL u CEL*
  μL  ¼ ΓL u CEL*  μL : ð6Þ
Notice that ΨL u CEL*
  μL   ΨL 0ð Þ and ΓL u CEL*  μL   ΓL 0ð Þ if and
only if u CEL*
   μL. Thus, Eq. 6 implies that ΨL 0ð Þ  ΓL 0ð Þ if and only if
u CEL*
   μL. At the same time, we can show that ΨL 0ð Þ ¼ ΨL 0ð Þ þ ΓL u x1ð Þ  μLð Þ 
1 ¼ ΓL 0ð Þ þ ΨL μLð u x1ð ÞÞ  1  ΓL 0ð Þ, with the first equality due to assumption
(2), and the second equality due to assumption (3), if μL  u x1ð Þ þ u xnð Þð Þ=2. Thus,
if the expected utility of L is close to the utility of its lowest possible outcome, it
follows that ΨL 0ð Þ  ΓL 0ð Þ and u CEL*
   μL. A similar argument implies that
u CEL*
   μL if the expected utility of lottery L is close to the utility of the highest
possible outcome. We already established that these two conclusions are consistent
with the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes both for concave and convex utility
functions.
Intuitively, the underlying assumptions about the distribution of random errors
imply that errors are more likely to overvalue than undervalue the expected utility of
lotteries, when the latter is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome (e.g.
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improbable gains or probable losses). The stochastic utility of a lottery cannot be
lower than the utility of its lowest possible outcome. Due to this constraint, it is
relatively difficult to undervalue the expected utility of a lottery by mistake, when it
is already close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome. At the same time, it is
relatively easy to overvalue the expected utility of such lottery. Thus, in this case,
random errors reinforce a risk seeking behavior.
Similarly, when the expected utility of a lottery is close to the utility of the highest
possible outcome (e.g. probable gains or improbable losses), it is more likely to be
undervalued by random errors. The stochastic utility of a lottery cannot be higher
than the utility of its highest possible outcome. Thus, the overvaluation of the true
expected utility by mistake is constrained when the latter is already close to the
utility of the highest possible outcome. At the same time, there is plenty of room for
random errors to undervalue the expected utility of a lottery. In this case, random
errors reinforce a risk averse behavior.
2.2 Common consequence effect (Allais paradox)
There exist outcomes x1<x2<x3 and probabilities p>q>0 such that lottery S1(x1, 1) is
preferred to lottery R1 x1; p q; x2; 1 p; x3; qð Þ and at the same time lottery
R2 x1; 1 q; x3; qð Þ is preferred to lottery S2 x1; 1 p; x2; pð Þ (Slovic and Tversky
1974; MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979). This choice pattern is frequently found in the
experimental data and it is known as the common consequence effect. The most famous
example of the common consequence effect is the Allais paradox (Allais 1953), which is
a special case when x1 ¼ 0; x2 ¼ 106; x3 ¼ 5  106; p ¼ 0:11 and q=0.1 (Starmer
2000). Intuitively, when the probability mass is shifted from the medium outcome to the
lowest possible outcome, the choice of a riskier lottery R becomes more probable.
Four lotteries in the common consequence effect are constructed so that mR1 
mS1 ¼ mR2  mS2 and let us denote this difference by δ. Since the expected utilities of
a riskier and a safer lottery always differ by the same amount δ, EUT cannot explain
why the choice of the riskier lottery becomes more likely. In contrast, StEUT is
compatible with the common consequence effect.
Lottery S1 is a degenerate lottery and random errors do not affect its utility
mS1 ¼ u x2ð Þ. In a binary choice, prob S1¿R1ð Þ ¼ prob μS1  μR1 þ ξR1
  ¼ ΨR1 δð Þ.
Similarly, R1 is (weakly) preferred to S1 with probability prob R1¿S1ð Þ ¼ ΓR1 δð Þ.
Choice probabilities prob S1¿R1ð Þ and prob R1¿S1ð Þ depend only on the properties
of the cumulative distribution function of a random error xR1 that distorts the
expected utility of R1. In the previous subsection we established that ΨR1 0ð Þ 
ΓR1 0ð Þ, whenever the expected utility of R1 is close to the utility of the highest
possible outcome.2 In addition, if the cumulative distribution function of xR1 is con-
tinuous, it is always possible to find small δ≥0 such that ΨR1 δð Þ  ΓR1 δð Þ, i.e.
prob S1¿R1ð Þ  prob R1¿S1ð Þ.
The probability that lottery S2 is (weakly) preferred to lottery R2 is given by
prob S2¿R2ð Þ ¼ prob μS2 þ ξS2 Q μR2 þ ξR2
  ¼ R u x3ð ÞμS2u x1ð ÞμS2ΨR2 v δð ÞdΨS2 vð Þ and it
2 For example, in the Allais paradox, this condition is satisfied when the gain of one million starting from
zero wealth position brings a higher increase in utility than the gain of an additional four million.
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depends on the properties of the cumulative distribution functions of random errors
xR2 and xS2 . In general, these two errors can be drawn from different distributions. In
the simplest possible case when xR2 and xS2 are drawn from the same distribution,
prob S2¿R2ð Þ ¼
R u x3ð ÞμS2
u x1ð ÞμS2
ΨR2 v δð ÞdΨS2 vð Þ 
R u x3ð ÞμS2
u x1ð ÞμS2
ΨR2 vð ÞdΨS2 vð Þ ¼ 0:5 where the inequality
holds if and only if δ≥0. By analogy, we can also show that prob R2¿S2ð Þ  0:5.
To summarize, it is possible to find a small δ≥0 such that prob S1¿R1ð Þ is higher
or equal to prob R1¿S1ð Þ (if the expected utility of R1 is close to the utility of the
highest possible outcome) and at the same time prob R2¿S2ð Þ is higher or equal to
prob S2¿R2ð Þ (if random errors that distort the expected utilities of S2 and R2 are
drawn from the same or similar distributions). Thus, under fairly plausible
assumptions, StEUT is consistent with the common consequence effect.
Intuitively, when the probability mass is allocated to the medium outcome, which
is close to the highest possible outcome in terms of utility, an individual prefers a
degenerate lottery S1 to risky lottery R1 even when the expected utility of R1 is
(slightly) higher. Utility of S1 is not affected by random errors but random errors are
likely to undervalue the expected utility of R1 because it is close to the utility of the
highest possible outcome. When probability mass is shifted to the lowest possible
outcome, random errors distort the expected utility of both S2 and R2. If the
distorting effect of random errors is similar for both lotteries, an individual opts for
the lottery with higher expected utility i.e. lottery R2.
StEUT predicts that the common consequence effect can disappear if lottery S1 is
not degenerate. Conlisk (1989) and Camerer (1992) find experimental evidence
confirming this prediction. StEUT is also compatible with the so-called generalized
common consequence effect (Wu and Gonzalez 1996) but the theoretical analysis is
rather cumbersome and hence it is omitted (see Blavatskyy 2005).
2.3 Common ratio effect
The common ratio effect is the following empirical finding. There exist outcomes x1<
x2<x3 and probability θ∈(0,1) such that S3(x2,1) is preferred to R3 x1; 1 q; x3; qð Þ
and at the same time R4 x1; 1 qr; x3; qrð Þ is preferred to S4 x1; 1 r; x2; rð Þ when
probability r is close to zero (Starmer 2000). Intuitively, when the probabilities of
medium and highest possible outcome are scaled down in the same proportion
(hence the name of the effect), the choice of a riskier lottery R becomes more
probable. Notice that mR4  mS4 ¼ r mR3  mS3
 
and EUT cannot explain the
common ratio effect. StEUT explains the common ratio effect by analogy to its
explanation of the common consequence effect.
On the one hand, prob S3¿R3ð Þ ¼ prob μS3  μR3 þ ξR3
  ¼ ΨR3 Δð Þ, where
Δ ¼ mR3  mS3 . When θ≥0.5 the expected utility of lottery R3 is close to the utility
of the highest possible outcome, i.e. μR3  0:5u x1ð Þ þ 0:5u x3ð Þ, and ΨR3 0ð Þ 
ΓR3 0ð Þ. If the cumulative distribution function of a random error xR3 is continuous, it
is possible to find small Δ≥0 such that ΨR3 Δð Þ  ΓR3 Δð Þ, i.e. prob S3¿R3ð ÞQ
prob R3¿ S3ð Þ. On the other hand, prob S4¿R4ð Þ ¼ prob μS4 þ ξS4QμR4 þ ξR4
  ¼
¼ R u x3ð ÞμS4
u x1ð ÞμS4
ΨR4 v rΔð ÞdΨS4 vð Þ. If random errors xR4 and xS4 are drawn from the same
distribution and Δ is non-negative, we can conclude that prob S4¿R4ð Þ  0:5 
prob R4¿S4ð Þ.
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In summary, an individual chooses S3 more often than R3 even though R3 has a
(slightly) higher expected utility because random errors are more likely to
undervalue than overvalue the expected utility of R3, when θ≥0.5. In contrast,
utility of S3 is not affected by random errors. In binary choice between R4 and S4, the
expected utility of both lotteries is affected by random errors. If random errors xR4
and xS4 are drawn from the same or similar distribution, an individual chooses the
lottery with a higher expected utility (R4) more often. Thus, the common ratio effect
is observed. Notice that StEUT cannot explain the common ratio effect if θ<0.5,
which is consistent with the experimental evidence.3
2.4 Violation of betweenness
According to the betweenness axiom, if an individual is indifferent between two
lotteries then any probability mixture of these lotteries is equally good e.g. Dekel
(1986). Systematic violations of the betweenness have been reported in Coombs and
Huang (1976), Chew and Waller (1986), Battalio et al. (1990), Prelec (1990) and
Gigliotti and Sopher (1993). There exist lotteries S, R and a probability mixture
M ¼ q  S þ 1 qð Þ  R, θ∈(0,1), such that significantly more individuals exhibit a
quasi-concave preference M¿S¿R than a quasi-convex preference R¿S¿M , or
vice versa. Preferences are elicited from a binary choice between S and R and a
binary choice between S and M. Asymmetric split between quasi-concave and quasi-
convex preferences is taken as evidence of a violation of the betweenness.
In the context of stochastic choice, an individual reveals the quasi-concave
preference M¿S¿R with probability prob M¿Sð Þ  prob S¿Rð Þ ¼ prob S¿Rð Þ
1 prob S¿Mð Þð Þ. Similarly, the same individual reveals the quasi-convex
preference R¿S¿M with probability prob R¿Sð Þ  prob S¿Mð Þ ¼ prob S¿Mð Þ
1 prob S¿Rð Þð Þ. Thus, a quasi-concave preference is observed more (less) often
than a quasi-convex preference if and only if prob S¿Rð Þ is greater (smaller) than
prob S¿Mð Þ. According to StEUT, prob S¿Rð Þ ¼ prob μS þ ξSQμR þ ξRð Þ and prob
S¿Mð Þ ¼ prob μS þ ξS Q μM þ ξMð Þ. Notice that mS  mM ¼ 1 qð Þ  mS  mRð Þ
because lottery M is a probability mixture of S and R. In the simplest possible case
when random errors ξR and ξM are drawn from the same distribution, we can write
prob S¿Rð Þ ¼R u xnð ÞμSu x1ð ÞμSΨR vþ μS  μRð ÞdΨS vð Þ ¼R u xnð ÞμSu x1ð ÞμSΨM vþ μS  μRð Þ dΨS vð Þ
Q
R u xnð ÞμS
u x1ð ÞμSΨM vþ 1 θð Þ  μS  μRð Þð ÞdΨS vð Þ ¼ prob S¿Mð Þ when μS>μR. Similarly,
prob S¿Rð Þeprob S¿Mð Þ when μS<μR. Thus, an individual is more (less) likely to
reveal quasi-concave preferences when the expected utility of S is higher (lower)
than the expected utility of R.
The intuition behind the asymmetric split between quasi-concave and quasi-
convex preferences is very straightforward. By construction, mixture M is
located between lotteries S and R in terms of expected utility. Two cases are
3 Bernasconi (1994) finds the common ratio effect when θ=0.8 and θ=0.75. Loomes and Sugden (1998)
find evidence of the common ratio effect when θ 2 0:6; 2=3; 0:8f g, and no such evidence when θ=0.4
and θ=0.5.
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possible. If the expected utility of S is higher than the expected utility of R, random
errors are more likely to reverse preference S¿M than S¿R. To reverse preference
S¿M , random errors only need to overcome the difference between the expected
utility of S and the expected utility of M. This difference is smaller than the
difference between the expected utility of S and the expected utility of R. Hence, an
individual is more likely to exhibit preference S¿R than S¿M , which implies a
higher likelihood of the quasi-concave preference M¿S¿R. Similarly, if the
expected utility of R is higher than the expected utility of S, random errors are more
likely to reverse preference M¿S than preference R¿S. In this case, an individual
is more likely to exhibit preference S¿M than S¿R, which implies a higher
likelihood of the quasi-convex preference R¿S¿M .
StEUTcan also explain the violation of the betweenness documented in Camerer and
Ho (1994) and Bernasconi (1994) who elicited preferences from three binary choices:
between S and R, between S and M and between M and R. In fact, Blavatskyy (2006a)
shows that the violations of the betweenness are compatible with any Fechner-type
model of stochastic choice with error term additive on the utility scale.
3 Fit to experimental data
This section presents a parametric estimation of StEUT using the data from ten well-
known experimental studies. Experimental datasets do not allow for non-parametric
estimation of StEUT. StEUT admits the possibility that the distribution or random
errors is lottery-specific. Thus, many observations involving the same lotteries are
required to estimate the cumulative distribution function of random errors for every
lottery. Parametric estimation allows reducing the number of estimated parameters.
3.1 Parametric form of StEUT
A natural assumption for an economist to make is that an error ξL in Eq. 1 is drawn
from the normal distribution with zero mean. To satisfy assumption (2), normal
distribution of ξL must be truncated so that u x1ð Þ  mL þ xL  u xnð Þ. Specifically,
the cumulative distribution function of ξL is given by
ΨL vð Þ ¼
0; v < u x1ð Þ  μL
6L vð Þ  6L u x1ð Þ  μLð Þ
6L u xnð Þ  μLð Þ  6L u x1ð Þ  μLð Þ
; u x1ð Þ  μL  v  u xnð Þ  μL
1; v > u xnð Þ  μL
8>><>>:
ð7Þ
where ΦL(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with
zero mean and standard deviation σL. Obviously, the cumulative distribution
function (7) satisfies Eq. 3.
The standard deviation σL is lottery-specific (Hey 1995). It captures the fact that
for some lotteries the error of miscalculating the expected utility is more volatile than
for the other lotteries. First of all, it is plausible to assume that σL is higher for
lotteries with a wider range of possible outcomes. In other words, when possible
268 J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286
outcomes of a lottery are widely dispersed, there is more room for error. Second,
since there is no error in choice between “sure things,” it is natural to assume that
σL converges to zero for lotteries converging to a degenerate lottery, i.e.
limpi!1σL ¼ 0; 8i 2 1; . . . ; nf g. A simple function that captures these two effects
(and fits the empirical data very well) is
sL ¼ s  u xnð Þ  u x1ð Þð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃYn
i¼1
1 pið Þ
s
: ð8Þ
where σ is constant across all lotteries. Coefficient σ captures the standard deviation of
random errors that is not lottery-specific. For example, in the experiments with
hypothetical incentives, σ is expected to be higher than in the experiments with real
incentives because real incentives tend to reduce the number of errors (Smith and
Walker 1993; Harless and Camerer 1994). In the limiting case when coefficient σ→0 we
obtain a special case of the expected utility theory: prob ξLj j > "ð Þ ! 0; for any ɛ>0.
Finally, a subjective utility function is defined over changes in wealth by
u xð Þ ¼ xþ 1ð Þ
α  1; x Q 0
1 1 xð Þβ; x  0

ð9Þ
where α>0 and β>0 are constant. Coefficients α and β capture the curvature of
utility function correspondingly for positive and negative outcomes. Utility function
(9) resembles the value function of prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979). However, unlike the value function, utility function (9) is
constructed so that the marginal utility of a gain (loss) of one penny does not
become infinitely high (low), which appears as a counterintuitive property for a
Bernoulli utility function. Since none of ten experimental datasets reexamined below
includes mixed lotteries involving both positive and negative outcomes, we abstract
from the possibility of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Equations (7)–(9) complete the description of the parametric form of StEUT. This
parametric form is estimated below on the data from ten well-known experimental
studies. For every dataset, the fit of StEUT is also compared with the fit of cumulative
prospect theory or CPT (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which coincides with the rank-
dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin 1981) when lotteries involve only positive
outcomes. A detailed discussion of why rank-dependent expected utility theory is a
good representative non-expected utility theory is offered in Loomes et al. (2002).
3.2 Experiments with certainty equivalents
This section presents the reexamination of experimental data from Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Both studies elicited the certainty
equivalents of two-outcome lotteries to measure individual risk attitudes. Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) recruited 25 subjects to elicit their certainty equivalents of 28
lotteries with positive outcomes and 28 lotteries with negative outcomes.4 The
4 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also used eight decision problems involving mixed lotteries with positive
and negative outcomes. Unfortunately, Richard Gonzalez, who conducted the experiment for Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) could not find the raw data on these mixed lotteries and no reexamination was possible.
J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286 269
obtained empirical data provides strong support for the fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes.
Definition (4) is used to calculate the certainty equivalent of every lottery.
Specifically, for cumulative distribution function (7), the certainty equivalent of
lottery L is implicitly defined by
u CELð Þ ¼ μL þ
σLﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2π
p e
 u x1ð ÞμLð Þ
2
2σ2
L  e
u xnð ÞμLð Þ2
2σ2
L
6L u xnð Þ  μLð Þ  6L u x1ð Þ  μLð Þ
ð10Þ
where σL has functional form (8) and utility function u(.) is given by Eq. 9. Thus, the
predicted certainty equivalent CEL is in fact a function of two parameters: coefficient
α (or β ) of the power utility function and the standard deviation of random errors σ.
For every subject, these two parameters are estimated to minimize the weighted sum
of squared errors WSSE ¼PL CELCEL  1 2, where CEL is the certainty
equivalent of lottery L that was actually elicited in the experiment.5
Table 1 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) dataset (lotteries with positive outcomes)
Subject CPT StEUT
Value
function
parameter
(α)
Probability
weighting
function
parameter
(γ)
Weighted
sum of
squared
errors
Utility
function
parameter
(α)
Standard
deviation of
random errors
(σ)
Weighted
sum of
squared
errors
1 1.0512 0.9710 1.2543 1.0971 0.0125 1.2376
2 0.9627 0.7428 0.7066 0.9572 0.4039 0.4868
3 0.9393 0.6804 1.1799 0.8863 0.5443 1.1507
4 0.7633 0.4858 2.1941 0.4722 1.5406 2.9207
5 0.7204 0.6943 1.0540 0.6248 0.5401 0.8587
6 0.9673 0.6630 1.2134 0.7776 0.8996 1.1326
7 0.7566 0.5566 0.7596 0.5539 0.9143 1.4563
8 0.7291 0.5759 1.3861 0.5821 0.7226 1.6746
9 0.6791 0.7646 0.9218 0.6386 0.3194 0.6807
10 0.4994 0.3079 11.789 −0.0040 3.2733 8.3627
11 1.2238 0.6344 0.7594 1.0124 0.9579 0.7094
12 0.9941 0.6921 0.7624 0.8420 0.7252 0.7563
13 0.6588 0.4210 4.2171 0.2738 1.8278 3.7672
14 0.8643 0.5843 1.9677 0.6772 0.9226 1.9173
15 0.4802 0.4000 6.7237 0.0387 1.4860 6.8369
16 0.6632 0.7258 1.2451 0.5406 0.4920 1.1556
17 0.7527 0.6830 3.2389 0.5497 0.8728 3.0933
18 1.0497 0.6088 1.0080 0.8656 0.9472 1.0523
19 0.6222 0.6908 3.1512 0.4823 0.5230 3.1211
20 0.7973 0.5264 1.3734 0.5413 1.2739 1.5855
21 1.0185 0.4987 1.2101 0.7265 1.2014 1.9130
22 0.8550 0.6057 1.0114 0.6337 1.1372 0.7605
23 1.1555 0.7893 2.3968 1.4594 0.0127 2.5917
24 0.5399 0.5205 3.7401 0.2231 1.0190 4.7727
25 0.7559 0.4530 1.3065 0.3818 1.3125 2.6873
5 Non-linear unconstrained optimization was implemented in the Matlab 6.5 package (based on the
Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm).
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For comparison, the prediction of a parametric form of CPT proposed by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) is also calculated.6 For every subject, two parameters of CPT
(power coefficient α (or β ) of the value function and coefficient γ (or δ) of the
probability weighting function) are estimated to minimize the weighted sum of
squared errors WSSE ¼PL CECPTL CEL  1 2, where CECPTL is CPT’s prediction.
Tables 1 and 2 present the best fitting parameters of StEUT and CPT for all 25
subjects, as well as the achieved minimum weighted sum of squared errors. Table 1
presents the results for lotteries with positive outcomes and Table 2 does the same
for lotteries with negative outcomes. For 19 out of 25 subjects, the utility function of
StEUT has the same shape as the value function of prospect theory: concave for
positive outcomes i.e. α∈(0,1) and convex for negative outcomes i.e. β∈(0,1).
Standard deviation of random errors σ varies from 0.0125, which indicates that an
individual behaves according to EUT, to 3.4419, which indicates that an individual
assigns certainty equivalents essentially at random. For 16 out of 25 subjects,
standard deviation of random errors σ is lower when lotteries have negative
outcomes than when lotteries have positive outcomes. One interpretation of this
finding might be that the subjects are more diligent (less vulnerable to error) when
making decisions involving losses.
The prediction of StEUT and CPT are very similar (correlation coefficient is 0.95
for lotteries with positive outcomes and 0.93 for lotteries with negative outcomes).
Nevertheless, Table 1 shows that StEUT fits better than CPT for 15 out of 25
subjects, in the dataset where lotteries involve gains. Similarly, Table 2 shows that
StEUT achieves a lower weighted sum of squared errors for 14 out of 25 subjects, in
the dataset where lotteries involve losses.
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) conducted a similar experiment to Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). They recruited ten subjects to elicit their certainty equivalents of
165 lotteries with positive outcomes. For this dataset, the prediction of StEUT is
estimated along the procedure already outlined above. Gonzalez and Wu (1999)
estimated CPT with a probability weighting function wþ pð Þ ¼ δ  pγ= δ  pγþð
1 pð ÞγÞ and I use this functional form as well to estimate the prediction of CPT.
For every subject, three coefficients of CPT (power coefficient α of the value
function, curvature coefficient γ and elevation coefficient δ of the probability
weighting function) are estimated to minimize the corresponding weighted sum of
squared errors. The results of parametric fitting for StEUT and CPT are presented in
Table 3. StEUT fits better than CPT for all ten subjects in the sample. A possible
explanation for such superior explanatory power of StEUT is that the dataset is quite
noisy. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) report themselves that weak monotonicity is violated
in 21% of the pairwise comparisons of the elicited certainty equivalents. Therefore, it
is not really surprising that the model with an explicit noise structure fits the data
very well.
6 Specifically, the utility of lottery L(x1, p1;...xn, pn) with outcomes x1 < . . . < xm < 0  xmþ1 < . . . < xn
is eu Lð Þ ¼Pmi¼1 u xið Þ w Pij¼1 pj  w Pi1j¼1 pj  þPni¼mþ1 uþ xið Þ wþ Pnj¼i pj  wþ Pnj¼iþ1 pj  ,
whe r e u xð Þ ¼ λ xð Þβ, uþ xð Þ ¼ xα, wþ pð Þ ¼ pγ ð pγ= þ 1 pð ÞγÞ1=γ and w pð Þ ¼ pδ
	
pδ þ 1 pð Þδ
 1=δ .
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Table 2 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) dataset (lotteries with negative outcomes)
Subject CPT StEUT
Value
function
parameter
(β)
Probability
weighting
function parameter
(δ)
Weighted
sum of
squared
errors
Utility
function
parameter
(β)
Standard
deviation of
random errors
(σ)
Weighted
sum of
squared
errors
1 0.7629 0.7027 1.1354 0.7568 0.4104 0.7768
2 0.7797 0.6996 1.2220 0.6040 0.7227 1.2889
3 0.8269 0.7415 1.0416 0.6150 0.7351 1.1325
4 0.9189 0.9458 2.4068 0.9259 0.1821 2.1180
5 0.7982 0.7517 0.6756 0.7262 0.4417 0.6646
6 0.8449 0.6817 1.9138 0.5873 1.0136 1.7034
7 0.7053 0.6314 1.0289 0.5187 0.8566 0.8882
8 0.8753 0.7742 1.3920 0.7922 0.4488 1.3531
9 0.7893 0.8257 0.6382 0.8132 0.2324 0.2464
10 0.5341 0.3220 11.191 0.1034 3.4419 7.1512
11 0.8241 0.4502 1.4381 0.4549 1.2060 2.6437
12 0.8769 0.6459 0.7200 0.8937 0.4759 0.6199
13 0.7339 0.6012 1.8306 0.5225 0.9917 1.5751
14 0.5424 0.7152 4.0507 0.4466 0.3131 4.6246
15 0.5127 0.4544 4.7260 0.0834 1.2485 5.1786
16 0.5113 0.3275 11.438 0.0858 3.1535 7.7726
17 0.7617 0.6792 1.0847 0.5815 0.7726 1.1324
18 0.8759 0.7498 1.7615 0.6140 0.8818 1.7514
19 0.7251 0.7260 2.6886 0.6438 0.4799 2.5950
20 0.9872 0.5670 1.1429 0.8858 0.7376 1.6388
21 0.9205 0.8139 1.7946 0.6580 0.7205 1.9273
22 1.4422 0.5445 0.5073 1.2752 0.8179 0.7485
23 0.9146 0.4978 1.1196 0.6455 0.9473 1.8291
24 0.5043 0.3730 3.6980 −0.0680 1.4884 5.6860
25 0.6932 0.5648 4.5404 0.4262 1.2306 3.8524
Table 3 Gonzalez and Wu (1999) dataset
Subject CPT StEUT
Value
function
parameter
(α)
Curvature of
probability
weighting
function (γ)
Elevation of
probability
weighting
function (δ)
Weighted
sum of
squared
errors
Utility
function
parameter
(α)
Standard
deviation of
random
errors (σ)
Weighted
sum of
squared
errors
1 0.5426 0.2253 0.3799 44.774 0.0955 2.1386 37.392
2 0.4148 0.3314 1.0153 27.241 0.3305 1.5108 19.162
3 0.5575 0.2665 1.4461 10.145 0.7155 1.7907 10.126
4 0.6321 0.2058 0.1523 40.382 −0.056 3.3712 26.255
5 0.3853 0.2351 0.915 17.368 0.2052 2.0611 13.435
6 1.3335 1.1966 0.4634 14.621 0.7546 0.3539 12.229
7 0.5306 0.2349 0.4106 25.176 0.1123 3.382 17.076
8 0.5184 0.4773 0.1263 61.97 –0.171 1.4185 37.992
9 1.1011 0.9363 0.2209 15.747 0.3776 0.6134 10.165
10 0.5991 0.5634 0.4315 36.291 0.2197 0.8115 28.311
272 J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286
3.3 Experiments with repeated choice
This section reexamines the experimental data from Hey and Orme (1994) and
Loomes and Sugden (1998). In both studies the subjects faced a binary choice under
risk and every decision problem was repeated again after a short period of time. Hey
and Orme (1994) recruited 80 subjects to make 2×100 choice decisions between two
lotteries with a possibility of declaring indifference. Hey and Orme (1994)
constructed the lotteries using only four outcomes: £0, £10, £20 and £30. This
convenient feature of the dataset allows us to estimate the utility function of StEUT
without committing to a specific functional form (9). Since von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function can be arbitrarily normalized for two outcomes, we
can fix u U0ð Þ ¼ 0 and u U10ð Þ ¼ 1. The remaining parameters u1 ¼ u U20ð Þ and u2 ¼
u U30ð Þ capture the curvature of utility function and they are estimated from the
observed choices.
The probability that lottery S with the lowest outcome xS1 and the highest outcome
xSn is preferred to lottery R with the lowest outcome x
R
1  xS1 and the highest outcome
xRn  xSn is equal to
prob S  Rð Þ ¼
Ru xSnð ÞμS
u xS
1ð ÞμS
6R vþμSμRð Þd6S vð Þ
6S u xSnð ÞμSð Þ6S u xS1ð ÞμSð Þ  6R u x
R
1
  μR 
6R u xRn
  μR  6R u xR1  μR  : ð11Þ
Explicit derivation of Eq. 11 can be found in the working paper Blavatskyy (2005).
For every subject, three parameters of StEUT (σ, u1 and u2) are estimated to
maximize log-likelihood
X
S
X
R
a  log prob S  Rð Þ þ b  log 1 prob S  Rð Þð Þ þ c  log prob S  Rð Þ þ log 1 prob S  Rð Þð Þ
2

 
;
ð12Þ
where a is the number of times the subject has chosen lottery S over lottery R, b is
the number of times the subject preferred R to S and c is the number of times the
subject declared that he or she does not care which lottery to choose.
An individual who expresses indifference is assumed to be equally likely to
choose either lottery S or lottery R (i.e. each lottery is chosen with probability one-
half). This interpretation of indifference is motivated by popular experimental
procedures. For subjects who reveal indifference, a choice decision is typically
delegated to an arbitrary third party (e.g. a coin toss or a random number generator).
Thus, if individuals reveal no preference for either lottery S or lottery R, they
typically end up facing a 50–50% chance of playing either lottery S or lottery R,
which is equivalent to the situation when they deliberately choose each lottery with
probability one-half. Alternatively, indifference in revealed choice can be treated as
an event when the difference in stochastic utilities of two lotteries does not exceed
the threshold of a just perceivable difference as modeled in Hey and Orme (1994).
The utility of a lottery according to CPT is calculated using the probability weighting
function wþ pð Þ ¼ pγ
.
pγ þ 1 pð Þγð Þ1=γ and the value function uþ U0ð Þ ¼ 0,
uþ U10ð Þ ¼ 1, u1 ¼ uþ U20ð Þ and u2 ¼ uþ U30ð Þ. Since CPT is a deterministic theory,
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it has to be embedded into a stochastic choice model to yield a probabilistic
prediction. Like Hey and Orme (1994), I estimate CPT embedded in the Fechner
model.7 Specifically, the probability that lottery S is preferred to lottery R according to
CPT is
prob S  Rð Þ ¼ 1 60;ρ eu Rð Þ  eu Sð Þð Þ; ð13Þ
where Φ0,p(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with
zero mean and standard deviation ρ, and eu :ð Þ is the utility of a lottery according to
CPT. For every subject, four parameters of CPT (u1, u2, γ and ρ) are estimated to
maximize the corresponding log-likelihood (12).
For all 80 subjects, the estimated best fitting parameters of StEUT satisfy weak
monotonicity, i.e. u2≥u1≥1. However, for 14 subjects the estimated parameters are
u2=u1=1, which suggest that these subjects simply maximize the probability of
“winning at least something.” For 19 subjects the estimated parameter γ of a
probability weighting function of CPT is greater than one, which contradicts the
psychological foundations of CPT (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Additionally, for
one subject the estimated value function of CPT violates weak monotonicity. For
these 20 subjects, whose unconstrained best fitting parameters of CPT are
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Fig. 1 Hey and Orme (1994) dataset (N=80)
7 I also estimated CPTwith a stochastic choice model prob S  Rð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ exp τ  eu Rð Þ  eu Sð Þð Þf gð Þ, τ=
const, proposed by Luce and Suppes (1965, p.335) and used by Camerer and Ho (1994) and Wu and
Gonzalez (1996). The result of this estimation was nearly identical to the estimation of CPT with the
Fechner model.
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inconsistent with the theory, the parameters of CPT are estimated subject to the
constraints γ≤1 and u2≥u1≥1.
StEUT and CPT are non-nested models that can be compared through Vuong’s
adjusted likelihood ratio test (Vuong 1989). Loomes et al. (2002, p.128) describe the
application of Vuong’s likelihood ratio test to the selection between stochastic
decision theories. Vuong’s statistic z has a limiting standard normal distribution if
StEUT and CPT make equally good predictions. A significant positive value of z
indicates that StEUT fits the data better and a significant negative value indicates
that CPT makes more accurate predictions. Figure 1 demonstrates that for the
majority of subjects the predictions of StEUT and CPT (embedded into the Fechner
model) are equally good. The number of subjects for whom the prediction of CPT is
significantly better (worse) than the prediction of StEUT appears to be higher if we
use Akaike (Schwarz) information criterion to adjust for the lower number of
parameters in StEUT.
Loomes and Sugden (1998) recruited 92 subjects and asked them to make 2×45
binary choice decisions designed to test the common consequence effect, the
common ratio effect and the dominance relation. The subjects faced a choice
between lotteries with only three possible outcomes. For 46 subjects these outcomes
were £0, £10 and £20, and for the other 46 subjects—£0, £10, and £30. Therefore,
the utility function of StEUT is normalized so that u U0ð Þ ¼ 0, u U10ð Þ ¼ 1 and the
remaining utility u1 ¼ u U20ð Þ or u1 ¼ u U30ð Þ (as appropriate) is estimated from the
observed choice decisions. The same normalization is used for the value function of
CPT. For every subject, two parameters of StEUT (σ and u1) and three parameters of
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Vuong's adjusted 
likelihood ratio statistic
Number of subjects
Akaike Information Criterion Schwarz Criterion
Prediction of CPT is significantly better at 
p 0.1%       p 1%       p 5%       p 10%
Predictions of StEUT and CPT are not 
significantly different
 Prediction of StEUT is significantly better at
    p 10%       p 5%         p 1%      p 0.1% 
z>
3.0
90
z≤
-
3.0
90
-
3.0
90
<z≤
-
2.3
26
-
2.3
26
<z≤
-
1.6
45
-
1.6
45
<z≤
-
1.2
82
-
1.2
82
<z≤
-
0.6
75
-
0.6
75
<z≤
0
0<
z≤
0.6
75
0.6
75
<z≤
1.2
82
1.2
82
<z≤
1.6
45
1.6
45
<z≤
2.3
26
2.3
26
<z≤
3.0
90
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
Fig. 2 Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset (N=92)
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CPT embedded in the Fechner model (u1, γ and ρ) are estimated to maximize the log-
likelihood (12) as already described above.
Estimated best fitting parameter u1 of StEUT satisfies strong monotonicity, i.e. u1>
1, for all 92 subjects. However, 38 subjects have an S-shaped probability weighting
function of CPT, i.e. the estimated best fitting parameter γ is greater than one, which
is at odds with the psychological foundations of the prospect theory. Among these 38
subjects, four individuals also have a non-monotone value function, i.e. u1<1. For
these 38 subjects, the best fitting parameters of CPT are estimated subject to the
constraints γ≤1 and u1≥1. The predictive power of StEUT and CPT (embedded in
the Fechner model) is compared based on Vuong’s adjusted likelihood ratio test.
Figure 2 demonstrates that for the majority of subjects the predictions of StEUT and
CPT are not significant different from each other. Thus, StEUT fits the experimental
data in Loomes and Sugden (1998) and Hey and Orme (1994) at least as well as CPT.
3.4 Other experiments
This section reexamines the experimental results reported in Conlisk (1989), Kagel
et al. (1990), Camerer (1989, 1992), Camerer and Ho (1994) and Wu and Gonzalez
(1996). In these experimental studies subjects were asked to make a non-repeated
choice between two lotteries without the possibility to declare indifference.8 For
every binary choice problem, the prediction of StEUT is calculated through Eq. 11
using functional forms (8)–(9) and the prediction of CPT—through Eq. 13 using the
functional form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (see footnote 6). For
every experimental dataset, two parameters of StEUT (either α or β, and σ) and three
parameters of CPT embedded into the Fechner model (either α, γ and ρ or β, δ and
ρ) are estimated to maximize the corresponding log-likelihood (12), where a now
denotes the number of individuals who have chosen lottery S over R and b denotes
the number of individuals who preferred R to S. Since there is no possibility of
declaring indifference, c is set to zero for every dataset. Of course, individuals do not
share identical preferences. However, a single-agent stochastic model is a simple
method for integrating data from many studies, where individual estimates have low
power, e.g. when one subject makes only a few decisions (Camerer and Ho 1994,
p.186). Such an approach is also relevant in an economic sense because it describes
the behavior of a “representative agent” (Wu and Gonzalez 1996).9
Table 4 presents five binary choice problems from Conlisk (1989). Conlisk (1989)
replicates the Allais paradox in Problems no. 1 and 2. Problems no. 3 and 4
constitute a common consequence problem without a degenerate lottery that delivers
one million for certain. Table 4 shows that the incidence of the Allais paradox
8 Kagel et al. (1990) allowed the subjects to express indifference but do not report how many subjects
actually used this possibility. Camerer (1989) allowed indifference in one experimental session. Camerer
(1989) reports that three subjects revealed indifference in almost every decision problem, and the rest
never expressed indifference.
9 There is also a practical constraint why the reexamination of individual choice patterns is not feasible.
Many of the experimental studies reexamined in this section were conducted over a decade ago and
several authors, whom I contacted, could not find raw experimental data.
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completely disappears in Problems no. 3 and 4. Finally, Problems no. 1 and 5
constitute a variant of the Allais paradox, when a probability mass is shifted from the
medium to the highest (not lowest) outcome. Table 4 shows that the switch in
preferences between lotteries S and R across Problems no. 1 and 5 is comparable to
that in Problems no. 1 and 2 (the original Allais paradox).
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of StEUT are α=0.6711 and σ=
0.8764. The best fitting parameters of CPT are α=0.4882, γ=0.4713 and ρ=
208.0832. CPT predicts very well the original Allais paradox; however, it also
predicts the common consequence effect for Problems no. 3 and 4, which is not
found in the data. StEUT makes a less accurate prediction for the original Allais
paradox but it predicts no common consequence effect for Problems no. 3 and 4.
Vuong’s likelihood ratio statistic adjusted through Schwarz criterion is z=−1.0997,
which suggests that the predictions of CPT and StEUT are not significantly different
from each other according to conventional criteria.
Table 5 presents experimental results for human subjects from Kagel et al. (1990).
The upper number in every cell shows the number of subjects who revealed each of
four choice patterns that are theoretically possible in the experiment. Kagel et al.
(1990) found frequent violations of EUT that are consistent with both fanning-out
(higher risk aversion for stochastically dominating lotteries) and fanning-in (higher
risk seeking for stochastically dominating lotteries) of indifference curves.
The second number in the second row of every cell shows the prediction of
StEUT. Maximum likelihood estimates of StEUT parameters are α=0.7112, and σ=
0.2549. StEUT predicts fanning-out in the first set of lotteries, and fanning-in—in
the second set of lotteries and non-systematic violations of EUT—in the third set of
lotteries. In contrast, CPT explains these choice patterns only when its probability
weighting function has an atypical S-shaped form (estimated parameter γ>1). The
first number in the second row of every cell in Table 5 shows the prediction of
unrestricted CPT. When the parameters of CPT are restricted, i.e. γ≤1, its fit (log
likelihood −125.839) is worse than the fit of StEUT (log likelihood −125.095) even
though CPT embedded in the Fechner model has more parameters.
Table 6 presents the results of estimation of CPT and StEUT on the experimental
data reported in Camerer (1989, 1992). In both studies, binary choice problems are
Table 4 Conlisk (1989) dataset: the fraction of subjects choosing S over R in the experiment and the
prediction of CPT (α=0.4628, γ=0.4553, ρ=133.381) and StEUT (α=0.5314, σ=1.8367)
Number Lottery S Lottery R Choice of S prob S  Rð Þ
predicted by
CPT StEUT
1 (106,1) (0,0.01;106,0.89;5*106,0.1) 0.5127 0.5012 0.4225
2 (0,0.89;106,0.11) (0,0.9; 5*106,0.1) 0.1441 0.1714 0.2403
3 (0,0.01;106,0.89;5*106,0.1) (0,0.02;106,0.78;5*106,0.2) 0.4651 0.5334 0.4904
4 (0,0.71;106,0.19;5*106,0.1) (0,0.72;106,0.08;5*106,0.2) 0.4651 0.4269 0.4947
5 (0,0.01;106,0.11;5*106,0.88) (0,0.02; 5*106,0.98) 0.2500 0.2275 0.2805
Log-likelihood 0 −689.7011 −697.7902
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constructed to test the betweenness axiom, the common consequence effect and the
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes. The important feature of the experimental design in
Camerer (1992) is that all lotteries have the same range of possible outcomes
(lotteries are located inside the probability triangle e.g. Machina 1982). Camerer
(1992) finds no significant evidence of the common consequence effect. This result
is apparent in Table 6. For the Camerer (1992) dataset, the best fitting parameter σ of
StEUT is close to zero, which is a special case when StEUTcoincides with EUT.When
lotteries involve small outcomes, the parameter of probability weighting function of
CPT is close to one, which is a special case when CPT coincides with EUT.
We compare the fit of CPT and StEUT, as before, using Vuong’s adjusted
likelihood ratio statistic z (significant positive values indicate that StEUT better
explains the observed choice patterns). Table 6 shows that CPT explains significantly
better than StEUT the choices over lotteries with large positive outcomes from
Camerer (1989). StEUT explains significantly better than CPT the choices over
lotteries with small positive and negative outcomes from Camerer (1992). For the
remaining experimental data, the predictions of CPT and StEUT are not significantly
different. Interestingly, for experimental data from Camerer (1989), parameter σ of
StEUT is lower when real rather than hypothetical incentives are used, suggesting
that monetary incentives reduce random variation in the experiments (Hertwig and
Ortmann 2001). It is also lower when lotteries involve negative outcomes suggesting
that subjects are more diligent when faced with the possibility of losses. These
observations support the interpretation of parameter σ as the standard deviation of
random errors, which are specific to the experimental treatment.
Camerer and Ho (1994) designed an experiment to test for the violations of the
betweenness axiom. Table 7 presents the frequency with which all theoretically
possible choice patterns are actually observed in their experiment, as well as the
predicted frequencies according to CPT (embedded into the Fechner model) and
StEUT. The predictions of CPT and StEUT are correspondingly the first and the second
Table 5 Kagel et al. (1990) dataset: the upper number in every cell is the number of subjects who
revealed a corresponding choice pattern in the experiment; the lower numbers in every cell are the
predicted numbers of subjects according to CPT (first number) with best fitting parameters α=0.4, γ=
2.0127, ρ=1.6165 and StEUT (second number) with parameters α=0.7112, σ=0.2549
278 J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286
T
ab
le
6
C
am
er
er
(1
98
9,
19
92
)
da
ta
se
t
E
xp
er
im
en
t
In
ce
nt
iv
es
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
pr
os
pe
ct
th
eo
ry
(e
m
be
dd
ed
in
to
F
ec
hn
er
m
od
el
)
S
to
ch
as
tic
ex
pe
ct
ed
ut
ili
ty
th
eo
ry
V
uo
ng
’s
ad
ju
st
ed
lik
el
ih
oo
d
ra
tio
V
al
ue
fu
nc
tio
n
pa
ra
m
et
er
(α
or
β
)
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
w
ei
gh
tin
g
fu
nc
tio
n
pa
ra
m
et
er
(γ
or
δ
)
S
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n
of
ra
nd
om
er
ro
rs
(ρ
)
L
og
lik
el
ih
oo
d
U
til
ity
fu
nc
tio
n
pa
ra
m
et
er
(α
or
β
)
S
ta
nd
ar
d
de
vi
at
io
n
of
ra
nd
om
er
ro
rs
(σ
)
L
og
lik
el
ih
oo
d
A
ka
ik
e
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
ite
ri
on
S
ch
w
ar
z
cr
ite
ri
on
C
am
er
er
(1
98
9)
,
la
rg
e
po
si
tiv
e
ou
tc
om
es
H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
0.
43
16
0.
71
01
13
.7
89
6
−8
83
.8
42
0.
29
49
0.
50
65
−8
95
.5
51
−2
.6
29
b
−1
.9
86
a
C
am
er
er
(1
98
9)
,
sm
al
l
po
si
tiv
e
ou
tc
om
es
R
an
do
m
lo
tte
ry
in
ce
nt
iv
e
sc
he
m
e
0.
98
81
0.
99
75
0.
05
16
−9
45
.0
91
0.
51
90
0.
33
83
−9
47
.5
23
−0
.4
98
5
+
0.
41
55
C
am
er
er
(1
98
9)
,
sm
al
l
ne
ga
tiv
e
ou
tc
om
es
R
an
do
m
lo
tte
ry
in
ce
nt
iv
e
sc
he
m
e
0.
00
00
0.
82
85
0.
41
41
−9
08
.1
24
0.
87
72
0.
04
33
−9
11
.5
41
−1
.1
94
9
+
0.
10
41
C
am
er
er
(1
99
2)
,
la
rg
e
po
si
tiv
e
ou
tc
om
es
H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
0.
01
41
0.
61
77
0.
35
08
−5
02
.5
52
0.
58
5
0.
08
68
−5
05
.6
23
−0
.7
23
8
+
0.
20
34
C
am
er
er
(1
99
2)
,
sm
al
l
po
si
tiv
e
ou
tc
om
es
H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
0.
98
47
0.
99
81
0.
10
63
−4
90
.6
52
0.
87
29
0.
09
14
−4
90
.6
18
+
3.
24
8c
+
10
.4
7c
C
am
er
er
(1
99
2)
,
sm
al
l
ne
ga
tiv
e
ou
tc
om
es
H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
0.
95
20
0.
99
12
0.
12
36
−5
21
.2
69
0.
69
51
0.
09
17
−5
22
.5
43
+
4.
40
7c
+
6.
54
4c
a
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
5%
(o
ne
-s
id
ed
te
st
)
b
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
1%
(o
ne
-s
id
ed
te
st
)
c
S
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
at
0.
1%
(o
ne
-s
id
ed
te
st
)
J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 34:259–286 279
number in the second line of every cell. Estimated CPT parameters are α=0.5555, γ=
0.9324, and ρ=1.0689, and estimated StEUT parameters are α=0.4812 and σ=0.1178.
Table 7 shows that the predictions of CPT and StEUT are remarkably similar.
Vuong’s adjusted likelihood ratio statistic is z=−0.4521 based on Akaike
Information Criterion and z=+0.636 based on Schwarz Criterion. Although both
theories fit the experimental data in Camerer and Ho (1994) quite well, they fail to
explain a modal quasi-concave preference in the last lottery triple, which is a
replication of a hypothetical choice problem originally reported in Prelec (1990).
Apparently, the parameterizations of StEUT (and CPT) compatible with an
asymmetric split between quasi-concave and quasi-convex preferences, when a
modal choice pattern is consistent with the betweenness axiom, cannot explain such
an asymmetric split when a modal choice pattern violates betweenness.
Wu and Gonzalez (1996) study the common consequence effect using 40 binary
choice problems grouped into five blocks (“ladders”). Eight problems grouped
within one block can be derived from each other by shifting the same probability
mass from the lowest to the medium outcome. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) find that the
fraction of subjects choosing a more risky lottery R first increases and then decreases
when the probability mass is shifted from the lowest to the medium outcome
(Figures 3, 4 and 5).
Table 7 Camerer and Ho (1994) dataset: the upper number in every cell is the number of subjects who
revealed a corresponding choice pattern in the experiment; the lower numbers in every cell are the
predicted numbers of subjects according to CPT (first number) with best fitting parameters α=0.5555, γ=
0.9324, ρ=1.0689 and StEUT (second number) with parameters α=0.4812, σ=0.1178
Lottery triples 
S($0,0.3;$80,0.4;$200,0.3) 
M($0,0.4;$80,0.2;$200,0.4) 
R($0,0.5;$200,0.5) 
S($0,0.4;$80,0.6) 
M($0,0.5;$80,0.4;$200,0.1) 
R($0,0.6;$80,0.2;$200,0.2) 
S($0,0.5;$80,0.4;$200,0.1) 
M($0,0.6;$80,0.2;$200,0.2) 
R($0,0.7;$200,0.3) 
S($0,0.66;$120,0.34)
M($0,0.67;$120,0.32;$200,0.01)
R($0,0.83;$200,0.17) 
 37  29  33 17 
26  22 20  24 23  21 46 46
15  14 13  15 13  14 5 6
 14  10 8 3 
3  4 4  3 3  3 0 0
 1  7  1 4 
5  6 7  5 5  6 4 3
 6 21  6 76 
15  15 15  14 14  14 42 41
 9  8 13 4 
9  10 9  9 9  9 4 5
 6  2  9 1 
5  6 6  5 5  5 1 1
 4  0  1 1 
8  9 9  8 9 9 4 4
Choice
pattern 
Revealed
preference 
,RS
,MS
RM
Betweenness 
,RS
,MS
MR
Quasi-convex 
,SR
,SM
MR
Betweenness 
,SR
,SM
RM
Quasi-
concave 
,RS
,SM
RM
Quasi-
concave 
,RS
,SM
MR
Intransitive 
,SR
,MS
MR
Quasi-convex 
,SR
,MS
RM
Intransitive 
N = 86 N = 83 N = 81 N = 106 
 9  6 10 0 
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Figures 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate the predictions of CPT (embedded in the Fechner
model) and StEUT about the fraction of subjects who choose a more risky lottery R.
The predictions of CPT and StEUT replicate the generalized common consequence
effect, though the predicted effect appears to be not as strong as in the actual
experimental data. According to Vuong’s likelihood ratio test adjusted though
Akaike Information Criterion, the predictions of CPT and StEUT are not
significantly different from each other. Vuong’s likelihood ratio test adjusted though
Schwarz Criterion shows that the prediction of StEUT is closer to actual choice data
than the prediction of CPT in ladders 2 and 5.
4 Conclusion
New decision theory—stochastic expected utility theory (StEUT)—is proposed to
describe individual decision making under risk. Existing experimental evidence
demonstrates that individuals often make inconsistent decisions when they face the
same binary choice problem several times. This empirical evidence can be
interpreted that individual preferences over lotteries are stochastic and represented
by a random utility model e.g. Loomes and Sugden (1995). Alternatively, an
observed randomness in revealed choice under risk can be due to errors that occur
when individuals execute their deterministic preferences. This paper follows the
latter approach. Individual preferences are fully captured by a non-decreasing
Bernoulli utility function defined over changes in wealth rather than absolute wealth
levels. However, individuals make random errors when calculating the expected
utility of a risky lottery.
Simple models of random errors have already been proposed in the literature
when the probability of an error (Harless and Camerer 1994) or the distribution or
errors (Hey and Orme 1994) was assumed to be constant for every choice problem.
Such assumptions are clearly too simplistic because individuals obviously make no
errors when choosing between “sure things” (degenerate lotteries) and very few
errors—when one of the lotteries (transparently) first-order stochastically dominates
the other lottery (Loomes and Sugden 1998). On the other hand, when individuals
choose between more complicated lotteries they switch their revealed preferences in
nearly one third of all cases (Camerer 1989).
StEUT assumes that although individuals make random errors when calculating the
expected utility of a lottery, they do not make transparent errors and always evaluate
the lottery as at least as good as its lowest possible outcome and at most as good
as its highest possible outcome. In other words, the internality axiom is imposed
on the stochastic expected utility of a lottery, which is defined as expected utility
of the lottery plus an error additive on the utility scale. Apart from this restriction,
the distribution of random errors is assumed to be symmetric around zero.
These intuitive assumptions about the distribution of random errors immediately
imply that the lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of its lowest
(highest) possible outcome are likely to be overvalued (undervalued) by random
errors. Therefore, on the one hand, random errors reinforce risk-seeking behavior
when the utility of a lottery is close to the utility of its lowest outcomes (e.g. unlikely
gains or probable losses). On the other hand, random errors reinforce risk averse
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behavior when the utility of a lottery is close to the utility of its highest outcomes (e.g.
probable gains or unlikely losses). Thus, StEUT can explain the fourfold pattern of
risk attitudes. The paper also shows that StEUT is consistent with the common
consequence effect, the common ratio effect, and the violations of betweenness.
To assess the descriptive merits of StEUT, the experimental data from ten well-
known empirical studies are reexamined. Ten selected studies are Conlisk (1989),
Fig. 3 Wu and Gonzalez (1996) dataset (ladders 1–2)
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Kagel et al. (1990), Camerer (1989, 1992), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer
and Ho (1994), Hey and Orme (1994), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Loomes and
Sugden (1998) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Within-subject analysis shows that for
the majority of individual choice patterns there is no significant difference between
the predictions of StEUT and CPT. Between-subject analysis shows that StEUT
Choice of lottery R ($0,0.97-p ;$200,p ;$320,0.03) over lottery S ($0,0.95-p ;$200,p +0.05)
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.45 0.65 0.85 0.95
Probability p
Fraction of subjects choosing R
CPT prediction ( =0.71, =0.83, =1.7)
StEUT prediction ( =0.17, =0.96)
Vuong's adjusted LR z=+0.1327 (AIC), z=+1.5773 (SC)
α σ
α ρ
Choice of lottery R($0,0.95-p;$50,p;$100,0.05) over lottery S($0,0.9-p;$50,p+0.1)
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.45 0.60 0.75 0.90
Probability p
Fraction of subjects choosing R
CPT prediction ( =0.67, =0.82, =0.76)
StEUT prediction ( =0, =1.16)
Vuong's adjusted LR z=+0.4653 (AIC), z=+1.9199 (SC)
α
α σ
ρ
Fig. 4 Wu and Gonzalez (1996) dataset (ladders 3–4)
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explains the aggregate choice patterns at least as well as does CPT (except for the
experiment with large hypothetical gains reported in Camerer 1989). Thus, a
descriptive decision theory can be constructed by modeling the structure of an error
term rather than by developing deterministic non-expected utility theories. For the
brevity of exposition, StEUT is contested only against CPT (or rank-dependent
expected utility theory), similar as in Loomes et al. (2002). A natural extension of
this work is to evaluate the goodness of fit of several decision theories as it is done,
for example, in Carbone and Hey (2000) and to compare their performance with the
fit of StEUT.
StEUT does not satisfactorily explain all available experimental evidence such as
the violation of betweenness when a modal choice pattern is inconsistent with the
betweenness axiom (see the last column of Table 7). Interestingly, CPT does not
explain this phenomenon either, though it is able to predict such violations
theoretically (Camerer and Ho 1994). StEUT and CPT embedded into the Fechner
model also predict too many violations of transparent stochastic dominance than are
actually observed in the experiment. Loomes and Sugden (1998) argue that any
stochastic utility model with an error term additive on the utility scale predicts, in
general, too many violations of dominance. Thus, a natural extension of the present
model is to incorporate a mechanism that reduces error in case of a transparent first-
order stochastic dominance. Blavatskyy (2006b) develops such a model by reducing
the standard deviation of random errors in decision problems where one choice
option transparently dominates the other alternative.
To summarize, there is a potential for constructing an even better descriptive
model than StEUT (and CPT) that explains the above mentioned choice patterns.
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that this hunt for a descriptive
Choice of lottery R ($0,0.97-p ;$200,p ;$320,0.03) over lottery S ($0,0.95-p ;$200,p +0.05)
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.45 0.65 0.80 0.95
Probability p
Fraction of subjects choosing R
CPT prediction ( =0.99, =0.99, =0.01)
StEUT prediction ( =0.90, =0.03)
Vuong's adjusted LR z=+0.8260 (AIC), z=+1.9961 (SC)
α
α σ
ρ
Fig. 5 Wu and Gonzalez (1996) dataset (ladder 5)
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decision theory can be successful with modeling the effect of random errors. The
latter approach makes clear predictions about the consistency rates (test–retest
reliability) when an individual faces the same decision problem on two different
occasions. This is a promising avenue for future research, which has received little
attention so far (see, however, Hey 2001).
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